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This paper examines the determinants of mergers and bankruptcies using firm level data from
Switzerland. We find considerable differences in the determinants of mergers and bankruptcies. Our
results support the notion that mergers are often undertaken to seize growth opportunities.
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1 Introduction
It is commonly accepted that there are essentially three modes of firm exit: (i) bank-
ruptcy, (ii) voluntary liquidation, and (iii) merger. In a controversial paper, Dewey
(1961, 257) stated that “most mergers [...] are merely a civilized alternative to bank-
ruptcy or [...] voluntary liquidation”. More recent work suggests, however, that there are
important economic diﬀerences between mergers and other modes of exit (e.g., Schary
1991, Harhoﬀ et al. 1998, Wheelock and Wilson 2000). Yet, due to data limitations,
empirical studies have rarely been able to make a clear distinction between mergers and
other exit modes.
We attempt to fill part of this gap by analyzing a novel dataset that has only recently
become available. This dataset on the exit behavior of firms registered in Switzerland
allows us to distinguish diﬀerent exit modes, in particular mergers and bankruptcies.
Employing duration analysis, we find considerable diﬀerences in the determinants of
mergers and bankruptcies. These concern firm- and industry-specific characteristics as
well as the impact of macroeconomic conditions on survival. Our findings support the
notion that mergers are often undertaken to seize growth opportunities.
2 Data and Models Estimated
To construct our firm level database on the drivers of exit, we merged the following data-
bases: (i) the Swiss Business Census (SBC 95) compiled by the Swiss Federal Statistical
Oﬃce, which is a full inventory count of all firms with more than 20 weekly aggregate
working hours existing in September 1995 (excluding the agricultural sector); (ii) the
Dun & Bradstreet Exit database (DBED), which covers the exits of firms listed in the
commercial register from January 1994 to December 2000 and distinguishes between
bankruptcies, voluntary liquidations, and mergers.
It is important to note that a transaction is coded as a merger in the DBED if and
only if a new firm was founded and both former firms were deleted from the commercial
register. That is, acquisitions (where only one of the firms was deleted from the com-
mercial register) are coded as voluntary liquidations. As a consequence, the DBED does
not allow us to disentangle acquisitions and voluntary liquidations. We therefore focus
on the comparison of bankruptcies and mergers, where the latter are narrowly defined as
described above. The merged database covers an observation period from October 1995
to December 2000. Table 1 gives the descriptive statistics of the variables used below.1
<Table 1 here>
1See Buehler et al. (2004) for a more detailed description of the database.
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First, we first employ the Cox proportional hazard model with time-varying covari-
ates,
hi(t|xi(t)) = h0(t) exp(xi(t)β), (1)
where hi is the hazard function of firm i, h0 is an unspecified “baseline hazard”, and
exp(xi(t)β) is the systematic part of the hazard function, with xi(t) denoting the row
vector of firm i’s covariates xij, j = 1, ..., p, and β denoting the coeﬃcient vector. This
allows us to assess the eﬀect of covariates on hazard rates without having to impose a
particular shape for the baseline hazard (see Therneau and Grambsch 2000).
Second, we study a family of parametric models that explicitly specify the baseline
hazard h0 to assess how the hazard function varies over firm age. These models have
in common that the natural logarithm of survival duration, lnTi, can be expressed as a
linear function of the covariates xi(t),
lnTi = xi(t)β+i, (2)
where i is the error with a prespecified distribution that determines the regression
model. Clearly, the choice of a specific distribution is somewhat arbitrary when the true
distribution is unknown. We therefore report the estimated hazard functions for various
commonly used distributions and discuss to what extent they diﬀer.
3 Results
3.1 Firm Size and Other Determinants
Table 2 presents our results from estimating (1) for mergers and bankruptcies. Note that
we report the estimated hazard ratios rather than the coeﬃcients. We briefly discuss
the major diﬀerences in the determinants of mergers and bankruptcies.
<Table 2 here>
Size. For both mergers and bankruptcies, there is an inverted ∪-shaped relation
between firm size and hazard rate. Yet, the squared term is significant only for bank-
ruptcies, and the estimated coeﬃcients indicate important diﬀerences in the way firm
size aﬀects merger and bankruptcy hazards. Figure 1, which plots the total eﬀect of firm
size on the hazard for bankruptcy and merger, illustrates this: The impact of firm size on
bankruptcy reaches its maximum for very small firms (3 employees) and then decreases
monotonically. In marked contrast, the merger probability increases monotonically up
to a firm size that is beyond the largest firm in our sample (6,134 employees). That is,
large firms are less likely to fail than small firms, but they are more likely to merge.
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Industry. We consider the following one-digit industry sectors: (i) manufacturing,
(ii) construction, (iii) trade, and (iv) services. It is striking that bankruptcy rates are
higher in the construction sector than in any other sector. This reflects the “structural
crisis” from which this sector suﬀered during the period of observation.2 Interestingly,
merger rates turn out to be lowest for the construction sector (even though the coeﬃcient
is not significant).
Region. Previous work by Buehler et al. (2004) has established that aggregate exit
rates in non-German-speaking areas are generally higher than in German-speaking areas.
Our estimation results for bankruptcy rates are in line with this finding. The results for
merger rates, however, are reversed: Merger rates are significantly lower in non-German
speaking areas, suggesting that there are important diﬀerences in the principal drivers
of bankruptcies and mergers.
Export orientation. Exporting firms tend to have lower bankruptcy rates than
non-exporting firms. More specifically, firms exporting up to a third or more than
two thirds of their output have significantly lower bankruptcy rates than non-exporting
firms. The picture is less clear for merger rates: None of the hazard ratios is found to
be significant, which suggests that a firm’s export orientation does have little impact on
merger rates.
Macroeconomic conditions. Another important diﬀerence concerns the impact
of a change in the growth rate of GDP. An increase in growth reduces the probability
of bankruptcy, but significantly increases the merger probability. This suggests that
mergers were often undertaken to seize growth opportunities. The eﬀects of changes
in the Swiss currency’s external value and the number of previous bankruptcies on
bankruptcy and mergers hazards, in turn, are fairly similar.
<Figure 1 here>
3.2 The Eﬀect of Firm Age
We use the same covariates as above to estimate a family of models given by (2), making
alternative assumptions on the probability distribution of survival duration (Exponen-
tial, Weibull, Log-normal and Log-logistic).3 Figures 2 and 3 show that the estimated
hazard functions for both bankruptcies and mergers tend to decrease with firm age,
which is in line with previous literature (e.g. Mata and Portugal 1994, Audretsch et
al. 2000).4 The crucial influence of size (and not age) combined with the possible motive
2See, e.g., the Historical Dictionary of Switzerland (http://www.lexhist.ch).
3See Gouriéroux and Jasiak (2003) for the properties of these distributions functions.
4The regression results are available on request from the authors.
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of external growth by merger suggests that firms often merge for reasons unrelated to
business failure.
<Figures 2 and 3 here>
4 Conclusions
We find that the standard prediction of the exit literature–large firms tend to have lower
hazard rates than small firms–is inappropriate for mergers. In fact, the opposite seems
to be true: Large firms are more likely to merge than small firms. A firm’s age, in turn,
aﬀects the likelihood of bankruptcy and merger in very similar ways: Both bankruptcy
and merger rates decrease with age. The notion that mergers are often undertaken to
seize growth opportunities is consistent with the finding that merger rates tend to be
particularly low in industries and regions where bankruptcy rates are particularly high.
Also, merger rates tend to increase with macroeconomic growth, whereas bankruptcy
rates decrease.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics (source: SBC 95, DBED, SNB, own calculations)
Code Variable Contents Mean/Value Std. Dev./Share
Cardinal Variables Mean Std. Dev.
Survival
Duration Lifetime of the firm (quarters) censored/truncated
Size
Emp Number of employees 13.63 61.36
Macroeconomic conditions
GDP Growth Growth of GDP (1993-1998) 0.83 1.01
Ext Val Swiss Franc’s external value, index (1994-1999) 102.45 4.82
Bankrupt Number of bankruptcies (per quarter) 45.70 4.78
Categorical Variables Value Share (%)
Industry
Manufact Manufacturing Reference var. 18.36
Construct Construction 0(no), 1(yes) 12.10
Trade Trade 0(no), 1(yes) 29.63
Service Service 0(no), 1(yes) 39.90P
= 100
Regions
Eastern CH Eastern CH, Zürich Reference var. 34.11
and Graubünden
NW CH Northwestern CH 0(no), 1(yes) 23.82
and Bern
Central CH Central CH 0(no), 1(yes) 10.66
French CH French CH 0(no), 1(yes) 24.53
Ticino Ticino 0(no), 1(yes) 6.87P
= 100
Export Shares
Exposh 1 no export Reference var. 73.73
Exposh 2 < 13 0(no), 1(yes) 13.23
Exposh 3
£
1
3 ,
2
3
¤
0(no), 1(yes) 4.62
Exposh 4 > 23 0(no), 1(yes) 8.42P
= 100
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Table 2: Estimated hazard ratios (exp(bβj), j = 1, ..., p)
Covariates Bankruptcies Mergers
Size
LnEmp 1.1457∗∗∗ 1.5472∗∗∗
(0.0528) (0.1543)
(LnEmp)2 0.9376∗∗∗ 0.9758
(0.0110) (0.0176)
Industry
Construct 1.4095∗∗∗ 0.7663
(0.0835) (0.1367)
Trade 0.9033∗ 1.1907
(0.0471) (0.1515)
Services 0.7960∗∗∗ 1.0344
(0.0402) (0.1286)
Region
NW CH 1.1199∗∗ 0.8920
(0.0530) (0.0987)
Central CH 0.9541 1.0217
(0.0622) (0.1443)
French CH 1.3762∗∗∗ 0.5973∗∗∗
(0.0614) (0.0758)
Ticino 1.4152∗∗∗ 0.5928∗∗
(0.0939) (0.1280)
Export Orientation
Exposh 2 0.8168∗∗∗ 0.9732
(0.0470) (0.1238)
Exposh 3 1.0637 1.1190
(0.0865) (0.2188)
Exposh 4 0.8226∗∗∗ 1.1405
(0.0561) (0.1772)
––––––––––— Table continued on next page ––––––––––—
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Table 2: Estimated hazard ratios (continued)
Covariates Bankruptcies Mergers
Macroeconomic Conditions
GDP Growth 0.8942∗∗∗ 1.3779∗∗∗
(0.0262) (0.1001)
Ext Val 1.1371∗∗∗ 1.0834∗∗∗
(0.0089) (0.0325)
Bankrupt 1.0011∗∗∗ 1.0020∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0003)
Log-likelihood −31, 724.12 −4, 708.62
Number of Subjects 54, 750 54, 750
Number of Bankr./Mergers 3, 431 524
Figures in parentheses are standard errors.
*,**,*** Coeﬃcients are significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Dummy Coding of Categorical Variables
Industry: Manufact (ref. var.), Construct, Trade, Services;
Region: Eastern CH (ref. var.), NW CH, Central CH, French CH, Ticino;
Export: Exposh 1 (ref. var.), Exposh 2, Exposh 3, Exposh 4.
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Figure 1: Hazard ratio as a function of firm size
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Figure 2: Bankruptcy hazard as a function of firm age
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Figure 3: Merger hazard as a function of firm age
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